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		DIRECTORATE	OF INTELLIG	ENCE		
		JU	LY 1987			
		NICARAGUA	AND EL SALVA	DOR		
		MONTHLY	REPORT #6			25X1
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and c	comments are w	elcome and s	hould be add:	ressed to	Chief, Middle	0EV4
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NICARAGUA AND EL SALVADOR MONTHLY REPORT #6

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NICARAGUA

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Developments During July

The Insurgent Effort

The insurgents' strategy of expanding the geographic extent of their operations and forcing the regime to defend multiple targets is stretching government resources thin while providing the rebels an opportunity to attack larger and more significant military targets. (See attached indicators.) Meanwhile, the overall level of fighting remained relatively high during July, and the number of combatants inside Nicaragua increased slightly, but a decline in aerial resupply tonnage and food shortages caused some insurgent groups to head for Honduras late in the month.	25 X 1
During the past month, the insurgents have spread the war into more populated areas and begun to launch more complex multiunit operations.	25X1 25X1
They also attacked the towns of Quilali in late June and San Jose de Bocay in mid-July, supported by mortar fire and using road ambushes to slow government reinforcements. Although the resulting publicity both inside Nicaragua and internationally highlighted the guerrillas'	25X1
willingness to attack larger targets, the deaths of some civilians led to new charges of human rights abuses.	25 X 1
the attack on San Jose de Bocay, the Sandinistas' forward support base for operations in north-central Nicaragua, was planned to take advantage of the temporary deployment of large numbers of government troops to Matagalpa on 19 July to provide protection for the Sandinista anniversary celebration there. Sixteen separate rebel units surrounded San Jose de Bocay and claimed to have captured the airstrip, an artillery base, and several nearby cooperatives, but failed to overrun the militia battalion garrison in the center of town. Insurgent commanders claimed they destroyed three artillery pieces, fuel tanks at the airfield, and numerous other military facilities and then dispersed before government	25X1
reinforcements arrived. Many of these details have not been confirmed.	25X1
As a result of heavy rains, cloud cover, and the unavailability of the rebels' DC-6, aerial resupply tonnage declined for the second month in a row.	25X1 25X1
One large airdrop was made subsequently, but insurgents in the northwest probably will continue to rotate in and out of Honduras for resupply.	25X1 25X1
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	The Sandinista Regime
	On the political front, the Sandinistas held their eighth
	anniversary celebration in Matagalpa without incident. This was
	the second year in a row that anniversary festivities have been held in a war zone city. They also disputed claims of rebel
	successes at San Jose de Bocay by flying journalists to view the town and airfield. In addition, the regime avoided becoming
	isolated in regional negotiations by participating in a Foreign
	Minighton manting in Transfer and Italy
	Ministers' meeting in Honduras late in the month and by joining the other Central American governments in signing a peace accord
	Ministers' meeting in Honduras late in the month and by joining the other Central American governments in signing a peace accord at the summit on 6 August.
٠	Ministers' meeting in Honduras late in the month and by joining the other Central American governments in signing a peace accord
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
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
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		_	Weak Moderate	Strong								High Med Low	Le	vel of judgi	conf	fiden	ce
Mili	tary Capabilities		P4. (#112mm		1986 Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	1987 Jan	Feb	Mar	— Apr	May	Jun	Jul	1
1	Presence in country	y			•	•	0	0	•	•	•	•	0	0	•	•	High
2	Geographic extent	of c	perations		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	0	High
3	Command, control,	and	d complexity of	operations	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Med
4	Intelligence and se	curit	ty		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	High
5	Military initiative		11.00		•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Med
6	Combat proficiency				•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Med
7	Troop morale and				0	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	Low
8	Availability of wea	pon	s/ammunition/e	equipment	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	High
9	Logistic support				•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	High
Polis	tical Capabilities																
10	Leadership quality	and	l chariema		0	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•		_	
11	Cohesion and unity		Charisma	*	10	•	0	•	•	•	•	•	0	1	•	0	High
12	Appeal of moveme		nside Nicaraoua	- pp	0	•	•	•	•	0	•	•		0	0	0	High Med
13	Development and of				•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	0	•	0	_	
14	Cooperation of rura			our program	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•			_	0	High Med
15	Urban support	P.	- Puluio		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	High
16	Cooperation by Cer	ntral	l American state	s	0	•	•	•	•	0	•	0	•	0	•	0	High
17	Foreign suppport a			-	<u> </u>		•	•	•	0	0	0	•	0	0	•	High


	e Sandinista Regime y Indicators															
Leg	O Wea	icient k Ierate	SubstantialStrong								High Med Low	Lev	vel of judgi	conf	idenc	æ
— Mili	itary Capabilities	T-VL	W.V.	1986		اما	h. T	ln	1987		ls.e	1.		1.		
1	Command and control		***************************************	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Teb ①	Mar	Apr	<u> </u>	Jun		14-3
2	Strategy and tactics			3	9	9	9	•	3	9	3	3	0	9	0	Med
3	Intelligence and security			9	9	9	9	9	3	9	9	3	9	ļ		Med
4	Military aggressiveness			-	9	9	9	9	3	9	9	3	3	3	9	Med
5	Mobility/Presence in country	vside		9	9	9	9	9	9	9	•	9	9	•		High
6	Combat effectiveness	,		0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	Med
7	Recruitment and retention			1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	•	Med
8	Availability of weapons and	equipment	7/2-	•	•	•	•	•	•	ŏ	•	•	•	•	•	High
9	Logistic support	1 -1 -1	74	1	0	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		High
10	Ability to assimilate equipme operate without foreign advi		71.	•	•	•	•	0	0	0	•	•	•	•	•	Med
— Poli	tical Capabilities															
11	Directorate unity and cohesi	on		•	•	•	9	•	3	•	•	•	•	•	4	Med
12	Civilian/military relations			•	•	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	•	•	Med
13	Internal security			•	•	4	9	•	•	•	9	9	9	•	•	High
14	Political institutions			1	•	•	0	0	0	()	•	0	0	0	0	Low
15	Ability to mobilize mass sup	port		•	•	•	•	•	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Low
16	Control of political opposition		•	9	9	•	4	4	•	•	•	9	9	9	•	High
17	Ability to defuse religious/en	thnic disconter	nt	•	•	•	•	1	0	0	•	•	0	0	•	Med
18	Ability to deflect dissatisfact	tion with econ	omic performance	3	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	9	•	•	Med
19	Foreign political/diplomatic	support	•	•	•	•	•	4	a	•	•	•	9	•	•	Med
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
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Foreign Advisers in Nicaragua



CURRENT FOREIGN PRESENCE IN NICARAGUA


	Military	Civilian
Cubans	2,225*	2,225*
Soviets	75	200
East Europeans	100	225

^{*}Midpoint of 2,000-2,500

Recent Developments

Nothing to report.

Western Aid to Nicaragua^a



a Aid figures revised to include assistance from multilateral and private sources. b 198° figure is for first quarter only and may be incomplete

Recent Developments

	icaragua 25X1
received \$36 million in donationsprimarily foodst	ffs and
consumer goodsfrom Western sources during the fir	t quarter of
1987. The largest contributions were the EC, Swede	the United
Nations World Food Program, and the Netherlands. F	ivate
sources, led by US solidarity groups, donated more	han \$11
million of the total.	25X1
Venezuelan President Lusinchi, during a late-J	ly visit to
Mexico City, said neither his country nor Mexico wi	l finance oil
deliveries to Nicaragua on terms other than those of	the San Jose
Accord, which requires 80 percent in cash and allow	the
remaining 20 percent in long-term soft credits.	25X1
a proposed Contadora oil aid package for Nic	
	
likely to be approved in the near future.	25 X 1

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	NICADACULAN MUNANA DEGUME CARDONACA DE
	NICARAGUAN HUMAN RIGHTS CHRONOLOGY
regime cl a Chilean Rights As issued a the decli major cas discovere President Rights Co Commissio	uly, Sandinista accusations of insurgent human rights increased somewhat, following an eight-month low. The aimed that the rebels were responsible for the death of internationalist in late June. The Nicaraguan Human sociation, which is associated with the guerrillas, six-month report concluding that rebel abuses "may be on ne." The Association described its investigation of 22 es of insurgent violations, while noting that it had d 200 allegations of Sandinista abuses. Meanwhile, Ortega apparently has decided to allow the OAS Human mmission to visit Nicaragua but insists that the n's agenda and itinerary be approved by the regime. accusations of Sandinista violations decreased in July.
	INCUDCENIE HIMAN DIGWEG DEGOD
	INSURGENT HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD
23 June	
two or the	epartment resulted in seven civilian deaths, including ree children. Another six to 10 civilians were wounded, to regime press and US Embassy reporting.
28 June The M	Vicaraguan Interior Ministry claims that rebels killed a gronomist working with the Danish World University
28 June The M	gronomist working with the Danish World University Leon Department in late June, according to regime and
28 June The M Chilean ac Service in	gronomist working with the Danish World University Leon Department in late June, according to regime and
28 June The M Chilean ac Service in US press m	gronomist working with the Danish World University Leon Department in late June, according to regime and
28 June The Magnetic The Magnet	gronomist working with the Danish World University Leon Department in late June, according to regime and

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10 July	·
The re	gime press accuses the rebels of decapitating some 20
persons in I with them.	Matagalpa Department who had refused to collaborate
16 July	
During in Jinotega	an insurgent attack on the town of San Jose de Bocay
according to	Department, six civilians were killed and 11 injured to the Sandinista press and
Among those reportedly was	killed were a woman and her three-year-old son. who were shot at point-blank range.
	Tange.
22 July	
Several	l civilians were kidnaped by the rebels during an
ambush in ce	entral Nicaragua, according to the regime press.
24 July	
•	
The San	ndinista press says the insurgents shot at a civilian thern Zelaya Department, wounding two persons, and
then kidnape	ed a female passenger.
28 July	
The Nic	araguan Human Rights Association issued a six-month
report descr violations.	ibing its investigation of 22 allegations of rebel
	military prosecutor's office for the insurgency.

25X1 25X1

	SANDI	NISTA HUMAN RIG	HTS RECORD	
Early July				
Presid	lent Daniel C	Ortega agreed to	permit the OA	NS Human
Rights Comm	ussion to vi	sit Nicaragua i request of over	n response to	the
Oddar DOLOH	5 Scanding I	The Sandir	istas insist,	however that
the group's	agenda and	itinerary be an	proved in adva	ince by regime
officials. and schedul		s expected to be time next year.	e announced la	ter this fall
		Time none your.		
23 July				
committed be earlier thi	n Managua wi y Sandinista s year. Amo rrests, tort	January Mothers th details of h state security ng the abuses d ure beatings,	uman rights vi officials in escribed are m	olations late 1986 and
26 July				
Sandinista	civilians we troops pursu near Penas B	re killed and t ed seven Nicara lancas,	hree others wo guans as they	unded when crossed into
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	SIGNIFICANT NICARAGUAN POLITICAL EVENTS	-
19 July	The Sandinista government held its eighth Anniversary celebration in the northwestern war zone city of Matagalpa.	25 X 1

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EL SALVADOR

Developments During July

Political Developments

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Radical labor unions and other guerrilla front groups were increasingly active last month in their campaign to foment popular unrest and discredit the Duarte government, but their violent tactics and close identification with the insurgents appear to have cost them additional popular support. nationwide poll conducted by a Gallup affiliate in mid-July indicates that only 4 percent of Salvadorans believe the insurgents are winning the war, either militarily or politically. While guerrilla-controlled unions have continued disruptive work stoppages, the majority of organized labor remains progovernment, and we believe workers will continue to resist the radical left's efforts to orchestrate a general strike.

In the capital, leftist demonstrators repeatedly tried to provoke a violent confrontation with authorities, but the government's response was restrained, and only two minor clashes occurred during July. The security services -- which lack adequate manpower, equipment, and training to contain widespread civil disorder -- fear criticism from human rights groups, according to and police officers have been ordered to avoid confrontations at all costs. 25X1

Meanwhile, military frustration over the absence of emergency legislation--which, until its lapse last January, permitted the authorities to prohibit strikes and public demonstrations and detain suspected subversives without charges for up to two weeks--is unlikely to strain civil-military relations seriously. President Duarte told the Army Chief of Staff he will not reinstate extraordinary emergency measures at this time to avoid giving the guerrillas a propaganda issue,

He added, however, that he is willing to consider lesser measures if the situation deteriorates and street violence increases. Defense Minister Vides Casanova recently indicated his support for Duarte's stance in a conversation with the US Ambassador.

Military Developments

The government has extended its nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, "Operation Monterrosa," for at least another 30 days due to its effectiveness in disrupting guerrilla activity. Captured documents indicate that insurgent units in Chalatenango Department -- a key guerrilla stronghold -- have been forced out of their basecamps and isolated from other units, logistics bases, and local intelligence networks. The documents cite guerrilla

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
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vulnerability to ambushes staged by small, mobile Army patrols. indicates that, despite its overal	1 20/1
success, the military sometimes has failed to press the advantage	de -
because of inadequate leadership, discipline, and training in some units.	25X1
In other areas last month, the guerrillas continued to avoid government forces and conduct small attacks, ambushes, and sabotage of the economic infrastructureincluding the destruction of six bridges. Such actions probably were intended to divert Army units from "Operation Monterrosa" and to relieve pressure on insurgent base areas. While the guerrillas' transportation stoppage of 13-16 July succeeded in halting most commercial bus traffic in San Salvador, the High Command's decision to provide military transport for civilian commuters, coupled with its refusal to pull troops out of the field,	d


undercut the ban's effectiveness.

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Salvadoran Clashes August 1986 -- July 1987




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	COMING EVENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA DURING AUGUST	
	6-7 August Central American summit in Guatemala City.	25X1
	12 August General Noriega's fourth anniversary as Panama Defense Forces Commander to be celebrated with a regime-sponsored rally. 25X	. 1
	19-20 August Central American Foreign Ministers meet to discuss implementation of peace accord.	!5X1
	Late August Guatemalan Specific Affairs Minister Alfonso Cabrera probably will replace Mario Quinones as Foreign Minister. Quinones, originally scheduled to leave the Cabinet next January, has announced his resignation effective 15 August.	25 X 1

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